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Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 8/18/06
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
  Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
   FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$78.96
133.76
114.67
134.41
70.41
49.36
73.88
91.00
243.73
$80.17
135.39
119.95
144.12
67.89
49.27
73.77
100.00
229.50
$86.40
129.09
119.34
150.87
75.58
50.12
75.89
92.00
224.49
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.14
1.65
5.82
2.79
1.77
4.61
2.06
5.46
3.16
2.18
4.01
1.95
5.01
2.86
2.02
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
117.50
37.50
52.50
135.00
87.50
82.50
135.00
87.50
82.50
* No market.
The term “global warming” was coined in 1896 by
the Swedish chemist Svante August Arrhenius. He
observed that as the consumption of hydrocarbon fuels
and industrial production had grown over the years, the
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gasses
2(GHG), mainly carbon dioxide (CO , which accounts
for 80 percent of these gasses), began to correlate with
a global increase in temperature. There is now general
agreement in the scientific community that it is the
burning of these carbon containing fuels that is causing
global warming. There are two means to combat this
2warming: first, to reduce CO  emissions; second, to
offset emissions by sequestering (i.e. capturing and
storing) carbon in such places as old mines, oceans,
forests and agricultural land. 
International cooperation on global warming was
formally started by the Intergovernmental Panel for
Climate Change in 1997 through the Kyoto Protocol.
The emissions trading part of the Protocol was
modeled after the 1990 amendments to the U.S. Clean
Air Act and what had been learned in developing the
U.S. sulfur emissions market.  Emission caps are a key
part of such markets and countries who sign the
Protocol have to reduce their GHG emissions 5 percent
below their 1990 level by the year 2012. The Protocol
officially came into force in February 2005. Arguably
the most interesting feature is that the Protocol
established the framework for a global emissions
trading system where major corporations and other
entities can trade in emissions allowances, i.e. buy
allowances to cover emissions or sell allowances if the
company can find ways to reduce emissions.
Emissions can also be covered by buying offsets, e.g.
buying an offset from a farmer who agrees to
sequester and store extra carbon in farmland. 
Farmers can choose to sequester more carbon in
farmland by using some form of conservation tillage.
A three year study explored farmer awareness of
global warming, determined the type of tillage farmers
are using, and explored beliefs held by farmers
regarding carbon sequestration policies and efforts.
This survey was sent out to 4,200 farm operators in
seven counties in Nebraska, producing 770-usable
responses. We found that most farmers in our sample
(about 80 percent) are already using tillage practices
which lead to higher carbon sequestration.
Surprisingly, in terms of usual economic assumptions,
the analytical results showed that carbon sequestration
is not only a decision of a farm operator, but it is also
affected by the influence of family members,
significant others, relatives, friends and members of
the business community. This is to say, the tendency
to sequester more carbon on a farm is highly
reinforced by public opinion. This supports the hope
that even without the institutions arising out of Kyoto
(i.e. the U.S. is not a partner in Kyoto), farmers will
implement practices to sequester carbon.
Another interesting question which came up
during the work on this project was whether farmers
who sequester carbon, given the opportunity, would
sell their offsets to corporate businesses or would
these farmers be willing to donate or sell offsets to an
environmental agency or group? The problem with
selling the offsets to the environmental entity is the
lower price and profit from the sale. 
With this question in mind we developed an
experiment which basically showed that yes, the
environmental buyers similar to the Carbfund and
National Network Ceres (entities who are currently
active environmental buyers in the U.S.) could be
strong players on the carbon offset market. Could
such entities compete effectively with the Chicago
Climate Exchange, who represents mainly large
corporate buyers of offsets from farmers in Iowa,
Kansas and Nebraska? During the experiment,
conducted with students and non-student residents of
Lincoln, we asked participants to make real decisions
regarding selling their imaginary offsets to two buyers
during several rounds. Participants earned  less if they
sold to the environmental agency (we named it the
Conservancy Project) and more if they sold it to the
exchange represented by large corporations (we
named it the Viking Climate Exchange). They could
earn as much as $30 for less than one hour of playing
the game if they sold all of their offsets to the
Exchange.
Most of the participants were willing to earn less
money by selling at least part of their offsets to the
Conservancy Project rather than to the Climate Ex-
change. Participants played this game with a computer,
for several rounds. The choice became more difficult
as the game proceeded. In the first round both buyers
were paid $1 per metric ton of offset;  by round 15 the
Climate Exchange paid $8, whereas the Conservancy
Project paid only $3. Some were given up to 20
rounds; with the number of rounds set randomly. The
decision making process was so intense that one
person told the experimenter that she felt she would
sell her soul if she sold all her offsets to the Climate
Exchange. The graph shows that the average number
of offsets sold to the Conservancy Project were above
30 percent, even for the last rounds.
This result is very encouraging. Basically,
participants were giving up about 12 percent of their
potential earnings of $30 to show that environmental
concerns matter for them. Moreover, the experiment
demonstrated that the environmental entities can buy
offsets for prices lower than the climate exchanges,
and a lot of individuals will still be willing to sell the
offsets to them. We expect most farmers would do the
same S being willing to do the “right thing” and not
just “maximize profits” as traditional economics would
predict.
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